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The 1994 and 1996 congressional elections were unprecedented watershed events

in recent electoral history. In 1994, the RepUblicans gained. control of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate for the fIrst time in 40 years. Not only did the Republicans
sweep control of both chambers of Congress, but they did so overwhelmingly. Not one
Republican incumbent seeking reelection lost in the House, the Senate, or in state
governorships.

The new Republican leadership of the l04th Congress, particularly

Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R-GA), led a wave of conservatism through
legislation in the Contract with America and the budget debate of 1996.

In the 1996

elections. despite the reelection of President Bill Clinton to the White House, the first
Democrat to be reelected to a second term since Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Republicans
~::

~

kept control of lhe House and Senate. They did so giving up only five seats in the House
and gaining two in the Senate.
The closest historical elections to 1994 and 1996 were those during the Harry
Truman presidency in 1946 and 1948. As happened in 1994, the Republicans triumphed in
1946. taking control of both chambers of Congress. However the Republicans in the 80th
Congress, nicknamed the "Do-Nolhing Congress," were less successful in 1948 when the
Democrats rebounded and recaptured control.
The differences in these election results raise several questions about the role and
purpose of congressional elections in our democratic society. What factors could explain
why two such similar elections, those of 1946 and 1994, were followed by two such
different elections. those of 1948 and 1996? Has the relationship between congressional
elections and congressional behaviors changed in the past 50 years? Are congressional
elections still a referendum of the previous Congress and the incumbent presidency, or are
other factors influencing the electorate's voting patterns? Were the midterm elections of
1946. and 1994 just extreme examples of what political scientists and politicians have come

1

to expect in off-year elections? And fmally, what do these periods indicate about the future

of divided government in the United States?
The remainder of this thesis will answer these questions in order to understand
more thoroughly the relationship between congressional elections and congressional
behavior.

The first section provides a brief history of the purpose of congressional

elections as designed by our Founders, followed by a literarure review discussing post
World War IT theories of congressional campaigns, elections, and divided government.
Section IT describes the Truman experience between 1946 and 1948, the congressional
elections of 1946 and 1948 as well as the record of the 80th Congress. Section III follows
a similar format, discussing the Clinton experience, the congressional elections of 1994 and
1996, and the record of the 104th Congress. Section IV is an analysis comparing the data
presented in Sections IT and ill and answering the questions raised above in addition to a
~-

conclusion.
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I. Literature Review

In order to underst.and the particular elections of 1946, 1948, 1994 and 1996, one
must have a clear understanding of the purpose of elections in a democratic society and how
the.y were designed by our Founders to fulfill that role. Paul Hermson, a political scientist
specializing on congressional elections, explained the purpose of elections as:
the centerpiece of democracy. They are the means Americans use to choose
their political leader, and they give those who have been elected the
authority to rule. Elections also provide the American people with a vehicle
for expressing their views about the directions they think this rule ought to
take. in theory. elections are the principal mechanism for ensuring
"government of the people, by the people [and] for the people.")

0:

"
Hermson's

explanation of elections sterns from the historical debate over the structure of

democracy in the United States. as was discussed by delegates at the Constitutional
Convention in 1787.
At the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. it was easily agreed that the United
States would have an elected legislature. However, the organization, the powers. and the
selection process of the legislative branch were topics open for debate. The Founders were
punctilious in creating a Constitution for the nascent government.
extensively over the timing and structure of congressional elections.

They deliberated
The basis of

representation, such as how the seats in the legislature were to be apponioned, and the
extent of popular participation in electing officials, was most controversial? Delegates from
large states naturally wanted representation to be apportioned by population, while delegates
from smaller states feared that their interests would be outweighed if only population size
mattered, thus they naturally preferred equal representation.

This initial conflict was

I Paul S. Hermson, Congressionol Elections: Campaigning at Home aruJ in Washington (Washington.
DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. 1995). 1.
2 Stephen J. Wayne, G. Calvin Mackenz.i.e, David M. O'Brien, and Richard L. Cole, The Politics of
American Govemment 2nd ed. (New York: 51. Martin's Press, 1997),37.
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resolved through what is today known as the "Great Compromise," a political agreement to
establish a bicameral legislature. which had been exemplified in Britain, and had the support
of 10 of the 13 colonies. 3 The House of Representatives, as established in Article I, Section
2 of the U.S. Constitution, apportioned seats by population to meet the demands of the
larger states. Article I, Section 3 of the U.S. Constirution met the demands of the smaller
states by establishing the Senate, in which each state would have equal representation by
choosing two senators.
Delegates also debated the extent to which the election of representatives and
senators should be conducted through popular participation.

A bicameral legislarure

certainly allowed for different levels of popular involvement in choosing members of
Congress.

Anti-Federalists supported annual elections in the House of Representatives,

however, this concept was starkly opposed by Federalists, led by James Madison, who
,"

favored three-year terms for members of the House. In Federalist No. 37. Madison argued
for less frequent elections..While he conceded that liberty demanded frequent elections, he
advocated that the stability and energy of a government required longer terms of office. As
Madison explained in Federalist No. 37:
The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side not only that
all power should be deri ved from the people, but that those intrusted with it
should be kept in dependence on the people by a short duration of their
appointments; and that 'even during this shon period that trust should be
placed not in a few, but a number of hands. Stability. on the contrary,
requires that the hands in which power is lodged should continue for a
length of time the same.... whilst energy in government requires not only a
certain duration of power, but the execution of it by a single hand. 4

The Founders agreed that biennial elections were the compromise between annual elections
and three-year terms. As Gary Jacobson explained, "Broad suffrage and short terms were

, Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of CongressioTlLll Elections 3rd ed. (New York: HarperCollins
Publishers, 1992), 8.
4 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (New York.: Penguin Books,
1788), 243-244.
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meant to ensure that one branch of government, the House, remained as close as possible to
the people." s
By contrast, the Senate was designed to be more isolated from likely shifts in public
sentiments. The term of office was set for six years, again a compromise from three, four,
five, six, seven, and nine years that had all be proposed. 6 Continuity was stressed by
having one third of the Senate's membership elected every two years. In addition, senators
were to be chosen by stale legislatures rather than by voters, thus acting as what Gary
Jacobson describes as a "stable and dispassionate counterweight to the more popular and
radical House. ,,7 Furthennore, this Senate selection process was expected to protect the
new government from the volatility thought to be characteristic of democracies.

This

selection process changed to popular statewide elections of Senate members through the
17th Amendment, ratified by the states in 1913. Thus, the fmal design of the Constitution
.:
,:

..



ensured the separation of powers, bicameralism. and federalism by requiring that candidates
for the House, the Senate, and the presidency be chosen by different methods and
constituencies, House members elected directly by the people, Senate members selected by
state legislatures (before 1913) and in statewide elections (after 1913), and presidents
selected through the electoral college.
The rules and requirements of congressional elections and candidates has changed
linle from how they were designed by the Founders. Requirements to be a candidate in the
House of Representatives are outlined in Article I, Section 2: candidates must be 25 years of
age, a U.S. citizen for at least seven years, and an inhabitant of the state in which he/she is
elected. Requirements for Senate candidates are outlined in Article I, Section 3: candidates
must be 30 years of age, a U.S. citizen for at least nine years, and an inhabitant of the state
in which he/she is elected. In Article I, Section 4, the Constitution gives state legislatures
the power to decide the time, places, and manner of holding elections for Congress.

Jacobson. The Politics of Congressional Elections. 9.
Ibid.
7 Ibid.

5
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While the Constitution carefully outlined the rules and

requirements

for

congressional elections and candidates. little was discussed about what the campaign
process to become a part of this newly designed institution would resemble. Like so many
parts of our democratic government, the campaign process in both congressional and
presidential elections has evolved since 1787.

In addition, lbeories of congressional

elections have also developed as political scientists have observed common trends over the
years.
Aspects of the electoral process help to provide insights about the functioning of the
U.S. political system. 'For years, political scientists have agreed that the aggregate outcome
of congressional elections provides national politicians with a sense of public sentiments,
particularly in regards to the state of the U.S. economy, the handling of the nation's foreign
policy. as well as satisfaction by Americans on their own standard of living. s In addition,
results of congressional elections have been described as referenda on the incumbent
executive's job performance, either punishing or rewarding members of congress in the
president's party. The President's parry vinually always loses some seats in midterm
elections. They frequently gain seats when the President is elected and the extent of the
midterm losses reflect the President's popularity. Furthermore, the quality of candidates
who challenge incumbents is also a function of the President's popularity. For example. if
lbe President is unpopular. weak congressional candidates will most likely run for office
from the President's party to challenge incumbents.

Since 1946, the average loss by

President's parry in midterm elections has been 27.5 seats, ranging from four to 52 seats. 9
Moreover. campaigns maner a great deal in the outcome of congressional elections. tO Thus.
the results of congressional elections are affected not only by perceptions of the performance
of the government, but also by the campaign process itself.

See Hermson. Congressional Elecrions: Campaigning at Home and in Washington. I.
Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, Michael 1. Malbin. Vital Statistics on Congress 1997-/998
(Washington, DC: Congressional Quanerly Inc., 1998),56.
10 Hermson, Congreuional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington. I; Jacobson. The
Politics of Congressional Elections, 61.
g

9
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Paul Hermson carefully explains the campaign process of congressional elections.

In his book, CongressioTUlI Elections: Campaigning at Home and In Washington, Hermson
describes how individual candidates, not political parties, are the center of congressional
campaigns. 11

While political parties may contribute money or elections services to

congressional candidates, the political parties do little to recruit candidates.

Most

-congressional candidates are self-selected political entrepreneurs who raise their own
money, put together their own campaign organizations. and run what has become referred to
by political scientists as "candidate-centered campaigns."12

By holding elections for

individual offices, the political success of one member of Congress is separated from
another and from other government officials elected to office. This system does little to
encourage teamwork in campaigning, but rather encourages House, Senate, state, and local
candidates to campaign using issues and messages that they perceive to be popular in their
U -4
,
districts. regardless of whether or not these issues and messages differ from those
advocated by their party's leader.

This type of system is entirely consistent with the

expectations of the framers of the U.S. Constitution. As lames Madison wrote in Federalist

No. 46:
infallibly prevail.. .in
the
members
of
A local SpUlt will
Congress...Measures will too often be decided according to their probable
effect, not on lhe national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices,
interests, and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual
States. 1.3
While years later, former Speaker of the House, Thomas P. (fip) O'Neill, Jr. (D-MA)
interpreted Madison to mean that "all politics is local," the effects of candidate-centered
campaigns do in fact extend well beyond district borders. As Gary Jacobson describes:
The electoral politics of Congress may center on individual candidates and
campaigns, but the collective results of congressional elections are what
shape the course of national politics. The possibility of responsible
Hermson, Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington. 5.
Ibid.. 5-6; Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections, 7.
1) Madison. Hamilton. Jay, The Fedualist Papers, 299.
II

11

7

representative government in the United States depends on the capacity of
congressional elections to influence the course of public policy.H
While the Constitution, state laws, and the political parties do little to prohibit
individuals from running for Congress, other factors related to the candidate-rentered nature
of the congressional electoral system favor individuals

with

particular personal

characteristics. Strategic ambition, which is "the combination of a desire to get elected, a
realistic understanding of what it takes to win, and an ability to assess the opportunities
presented by a given political context," is one such characteristic that separates successful
congressional candidates from the general public. 15 Since there is minimal party recruitment
for congressional candidates, most successful candidates must be self-starters. Ambitious
candidates, often referred to as strategic, rational, or quality candidates, are those political
entrepreneurs who make calculated judgments about when to run. Scholars have developed
an opportuiliry::eOst model that posits the likelihood that a candidate will run for office such
that the expected value of running is equal to the sum of the expected value of winning and
the expected value of losing.1 6 In determining the expected value of running for Congress,
strategic politicians consider a number of institutional, structural, and subjective factors.
The instirutional factors include filing deadlines, campaign finance laws, prohibitions for or
against preprimary endorsements, and other election statutes or party rules.

Structural

factors include the social, economic, and partisan composition of the district, its geographic
compactness. the media markets that serve it, the degree of overlap between the district and
lower-level electoral constituencies, and the possibilities that exist for election to some
alternative office. Other subjective factors such as the political climate of the district and
nation are also assessed in deciding whether to run. 17

I~ Jacobson,

The Politics a/Congressional Elections, 148.
Hermson, Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington, 31; Also see Gary C.
Jacobson and Samuel Kemell, Strategy and Choice in Congressinnal Elections (New Haven: Yale
University Press. 1983), chapter 3.
16 L. Sandy Maisel, Elizabeth 1. Ivry, Benjamin D. Ling, and Stephanie G. Pennix, "Re-exploring the
Weak-Challenger Hypomesis: The 1994 Candidate Pools," in Midterm: Elections of 1994 in Context. ed.
Philip A. Kli nkner (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 139-140.
11 Herrnson, Congressional Elections: Campaigning aI Home and in Washington, 31.
15

8

Incumbents usually have a much easier time deciding to run for reelection than
nonincumbents. Congress offers its members many incentives to want to stay in office.
According to Hermson, these advantages include the ability directly to affect policies and
issues that they care about. a challenging environment in which to work, political power,
and name recognition. IS Incumbents have an enormous advantage over their challengers
because they begin the general election with greater name recognition and higher voter
approval levels, greater political experience, more money. better campaign organizations
than their opponents, and they have already proven to be a successful candidate at least
once. 19 In addition, incumbency advantage offers official resources including salary, travel,
office. staff. and communication allowances.

The franking privilege which provides

members with the right to use the mails free of charge for "official business," which is
broadly interpreted to include most kinds of communications to constituents, is one of the

U

~

most important congressional perquisites?O The name recognition, paid staff, and franking
privileges that incumbents receive are often strong enough factors to deter strong
opposition. Given the strong incumbency advantage, it is not surprising that there has been
an average of over 90% reelection rates for incumbents seeking reelection since World War

11. 21
The greatest factor that affects the strategic calculations of nonincumbents

JS

whether or not the incumbent plans to run for reelection, and if so, how vulnerable he/she
is. 22 Fortunately, there are individuals who after weighing the strategic calculations, do
Ibid., 32.
Ibid., 205; Barbara Hinkley, "House Reelections and Senate DefealS: The Role of the Challenger,"
British Journal of Political Science. 1980. 10: 441-460; Thomas Mann and Raymond Wolfinger.
"Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review, 1980,74: 617
632; Lyn Ragsdale, "Incumbent Popularity, Challenger Invisibility, and Congressional Votes," Legislative
Studies Q/Ul.nerly, 198 I. 6: 201-218; Gary Jacobson, "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional
Elections." American Political Science Review. 1978,72: 469-491; Gary Jacobson and Samuel KerneH,
Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections; Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, "Salvation for
the Spendthrift Incumbent: Re-estimaling the EffeclS of Campaign Spending in House Elections,"
American Jou.rnal of Political Science, 1988, v32: 884-907; Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno,
"Rebull.a.l to Jacobson's 'New Evidence for Old Arguments,'" American Journal ofPolitical Science, 1990.
34: 363-372.
20 Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections, 38.
21 Ornslein, Mann, Malbin. Vita! Suuistics on Congress 1997-1998. 61.
Z2 Herrnsoo. Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington, 31.
18

19

9

decide to challenge incumbents, enhancing the legitimacy of our democratic system. Almost

all challengers begin at a disadvantage in that they almost always lack broad base support
compared to the incumbent Challengers must launch aggressive campaigns that allow them
to become visible, build name recognition. provide voters with reasons to support them, and
attract not only uncommitted voters, but also convince some voters to abandon the
incumbent. In addition, they must have the resources to communicate effectively with the
voters. which means spending money wisely and appealing to interest groups and media.
Given these challenges, nonincumbents face an uphill battle in efforts to defeat an
incumbent. Those who are successful not only have strong campaigns, but usually benefit
from an incumbent's failure.
Open seat elections are often more interesting because they are usually more
competitive and are won by smaller margins. Since voters lack strong personal loyalties to
U -4
either candidate, the partisanship of the district, and the skills and resources that candidates
and their organizations bring to the campaign have more of an impact than those races
involving incumbents. Factors outside of the candidate's control, such as national political
trends, redistricting, and media coverage, are also more important in open seat races.
Senate races are somewhat different from House elections.

First, there are on

average, only 34 races every two years, thus making it more difficult to make any
generalizations. Second, Senate incumbents not only have all of the advantages that House
incumbents have, but they use them to run statewide campaigns. The only difference is that
most challengers and open seat candidates are more "qualified" than those seeking the
House. Many have served as a Representative, governor, or in some other public capacity.
Previous political experience helps challengers assemble strong organizations, financial
resources, media coverage, and name recognition, all of which are essential components to
running successful campaigns. Since the field of candidates in Senate races is usually more
competitive, the elections are usually closer.

Moreover, senators oftentimes are more

closely scrutinized than House members. This was evident in 1996 in South Dakota when

to

incumbent Senator Larry Pressler (R) was defeated by the At-Large Representative, Tim
Johnson (D), and also in Iowa where incumbent Senator Tom Harkin (D) narrowly defeated
Jim Ross Lightfoot (R).2 3 Furthermore, Senators have statewide constituencies, making it
more difficult to establish personal ties with the voters.

House members, however,

represent constituencies of approximately 600,000 people within a smaller geographic
region, thus making candidate-voter relationships more personal.
Given the theories on congressional campaign strategies and different types of
races, the second component to understanding congressional elections is the voting pattelJls
of the electorate. In order to run a successful congressional campaign, candidates must
build coalitions of voters.

However, for many citizens, voting decisions are not very

important and are thus made with relatively little information. 24
From the 19505 with the publication of The American Voter until fairly recently,
.;

L.

.............

partisanship was understood to be the strongest influence on congressional voters. 2S
However. the political events of the 1960$ and 1970s help to explain the decline of electoral
partisanship.

First, each party nominated a presidential candidate from its ideological

extreme (the RepUblicans with Goldwater in 1964, the Democrats with McGovern in 1972);
second, the Vietnam War and civil rights issues split the Democratic party; and third, the
Watergate revelations hurt the Republicans credibility. While party identification is certainly
still an important influence on congressional voters, recent theories suggest that
congressional voters are more readily swayed by the individ':lal candidates and the amount
of information they know about a candidate, which again supports earlier theories of
incumbency advantage. 26

Unfortunately, most voters make their congressional voting

L Sandy Maisel, Kara E. Falkenstein, and AJexander M. Quigley, "Senate Retirements and Progressive
Ambition Among House Members in 1996," Congress & The Presidency, Autumn 1997,2402: 145.
14 Barbara Hinkley, Congressional Elections (Washington, OC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981),8;
Herrman, Congressional Elections: Campaigning al Home and in Washington, 156.
2S See Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse. Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American
VOler (New York.: John Wiley, 1960); Jacobson, The Politics o/Congressional Elections, 109.
26 See Miller, Warren E. "Pany Identification and the Electorate afthe 199Os.," in The Parties Respond:
CJuuzges in American Parties and Campaigns, 3rd ed. ed. L. Sandy Maisel (Boulder: Westview Press,
1998); Jacobson, The Politics o/Congressional Elections. 113-114.
13
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decisions with relatively little information. In a typical House race between an incumbent
-and a challenger, only about 20% of all voters can recall the names of the two major-party
candidates. In an open seal House contest only about one third of all voters can remember
the names of the major-party candidates. Senate races are slightly higher with 30% able to
name both candidates in incumbent-cballenger races and two-thirds being able to name both
candidates in open seat races. 27
While incumbents have enjoyed the increasing benefits of abundant resources and
advertising in recent years, their advantage in familiarity with voters has not increased. In
addition, voters favor incumbents even when they cannot recall either candidates name,
which led political scientists to question the defInition of "knowing" a candidate. Thomas
Mann was the fIrst to show that the many voters who could not recall a candidate's name,
could in fact recognize the name from a list, which is always available in a voting booth. 26
Thus, beginning in 1978, the National Election Studies included questions testing the
voters' ability both to recall each candidate's Dame and the less stringent test, to recognize
each candidate's name. When given the names of congressional candidates, voters
recognized the names of both major-party candidates just over 50% of the time in
incumbent-challenger races, and about 80% of the time in open seal races. Recognition in
Senate races for incumbeDt-challenger races and open seal races were 80% and 90%
respectively. 29
Given their ignorance of candidates and issues, voters use shortcuts to help them
make decisions on election day. Frequently used shortcuts include incumbency and party .30
Other voters make decisions retrospectively by holding the president responsible for the
state of the nation and either voting to reward or punish the congressional candidate of the
president's party accordingly.31
2'7

VI

Hermson. Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington. 157.
Thomas E. Mann, Unsafe aJ Any Margin: Interpreting Congressional Elections (WashingtoD, DC:

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1978),30-34.
Hermson. Congressional Elections: Campaigning aJ Home and in Washington, 157.
J() Hinkley, Congressional Elections, 37.
)1 Hermson, Congrt!ssional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington, 159.
29
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These shortcut are used by voters in all congressional elections. There are however
differences in voting patterns depending on if there is a presidential election or not.

The

- type of electorate and percentage of voter rumout differ significantly in midterm (non
presidential) election years. A study of the 1950s showed that the electorate in presidential
years was found to be composed of a larger proportion of voters

w~y

attached to either

political party and more subject to the political environment during the specific election,
notably, their feelings about the presidential candidates.
strong evidence that partisanship prevailed. This study

At midterm elections, there was

ied to

Angus Campbell's theory of

surge and decline in presidential elections, in which the winning presidential candidate's
party gains congressional seats (rhe surge) rhat are subsequently lost at the next midterm
election (the decline) when the pull of the presidential candidate is no longer in effect 32 The
theory of surge and decline is used to explain why, in every midterm election since 1934,
:~
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the president's party has lost seats in the House. 33
Voter turnout is also much different in presidential and off-year elections. Turnout
has been on a continuous decline since the 1960s with slight bubbles in 1982 and 1994.34
Voters participate much less frequently in midtenn elections; as Gary Jacobson explains:
"Participation in congressional elections is strongly influenced by whether or Dot there is a
presidential contest to attract voters to rhe polls; turnout drops by an average of 14
percentage points when there is not.,,35 Even

mpresidential years, there is a fall-off effect in

that House voting is usually about 5 percentage points lower than presidential voting?6
The results of the electorate's voting behaviors directly affect the composition of our
government Divided government, when control of the executive and legislative branches is
held by different parties, has been the common trend in American history. Since 1832 when

:n Angus Campbell. "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change." io Elections and the Political
Order. ed. Angus Campbell. Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes (New York:
John Wiley. 1966),40-62.
33 Jacobson. The Politics of Congressional Elections, 107.
34 Ornstein, Mann. Malbin, Vital Statistics on Congress 1997·1998. 51.
Jj Jacobson. The Politics of Congressional Elections. 104.
36 Ibid.

13

the convention system of nominating presidential candidates had been established and the
two-party competition had been revived, divided government has existed for 66 of the 164
years. 37 Between 1832 and 1952, divided government was best explained by political
scientists as a midtenn loss of unified control gained in the preceding presidential election
year. 38 From 19505 through the 19805 ticket splitting. voting for a candidate from one party
for one office and a candidate from another party for another office, almost doubled from
15% or less of the electorate to 25% or more. The increase in ticket splitting is a direct
consequence of the weakening of political parties which makes voters more likely to support
attractive candidates and issues rather than maintain loyalty to one party or the other.
However, ticket splitting is not completely random and has followed a pattern of supporting
a Republican presidency and Democratic congress.39
There is also strong evidence that voters prefer divided govemment!O There are
I

~,

~

.....
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different explanations for why voters prefer divided govenunent. Morris Fiorina notes that
until recently analyses for different political offices were isolated from one another.

As

Fiorina explains:
Presidential elections analyses employed one set of major concepts - panies,
issues, ideology, and candidate traits, while congressional elections
analyses employed a different set - incumbency, campaign spending, and
the quality of challengers...The major point of contaet between the two
areas of work was the notion of presidential coattails: the popularity of the
presidential candidates and the performance of the incumbent president have
some impact on the fortunes of congressional candidates4.1

Recently, this impact has been declining and presidential coattails have become much
shorter. Therefore, Fiorina offers what he terms as the "balancing" explanation of divided
govemment.4.2 He claims that voters choose divided government because moderate voters
Morris Fiorina, Divided Government 2nd. ed. (BOSlon: Allyn and Bacon, 1996), 6.
Ibid., 11.
J9 Ibid., 58.
4() Ibid., 64. Evidence taken from NBC NewsIWall Street Journal survey taken before the 1988 elections.
in which 54% of likely voters preferred divided government, wh.ile omy 32% preferred unified government.
~I Ibid., 63.
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engage m ticket splining to steer a middle course between the ideological extremes
represented by the parties. In addition, voters have difficulty trusting politicians of either
party, so they choose divided government to "balance" the political systern. 43

Gary Jacobson offers an alternative explanation of divided government, m that
voters have different expectations for presidents and members of Congress, as well as for
Republicans and Democrats.44 Jacobson's model matches party and institutional strength;
Republicans are more superior than Democrats in dealing with macro-econom1c management
and foreign relations, while Democrats are more compassionate and concerned about
ensuring fair distribution of national benefits and burdens.

Since the presidency is

preeminent in the realms of international relations and economic management, and Congress
is more concerned with clistribution, the electoral dilemma faced by the voters is resolved,
not necessarily consciously, by voting for Republican presidents and Democratic
;,'

...;..~

congresses. Fiorina counters Jacobson's theory by examining divided government at the
state level. He cites for example, North Dakota, a state whose recent patterns of party
control are exactly the opposite from the national trend. From 1960-1980, the Democrats
controlled the governorship while Republicans controlled the upper House. 45
The consequences of divided government are twofold. First. divided government
exacerbates the problems of efficiency and effectiveness that are inherent in the
constirutional fabric.

Second. divided government inhibits the accountability and

responsibility issues that are already problematic in a polity of weak parties and a separation
of powers. 46 Despite these consequences. voters have overwhelmingly shown their suppon
to continue divided control of our political system, perhaps indicative of the various interests
and preferences of the people in our society.

Ibid.; Jacobson, The Politics o[Congressional ElectWn.s, 241.
Gary Jacobsoo. The ElecUJral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder. Westview Press, 1990), 105
120.
4S Fiorina., Divided GovenvTl£nt. 30.
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While political science theories vary concerning the candidates and campaign
strategies in congressional elections, congressional voting patterns and behaviors, and
divided government, all scholars of American government concur that elections playa vital
role in the functioning of our democracy. Perhaps Richard Niemi and Herbert Weisberg
best summarized the functions of elections in a democracy in the introduction of
Controversies in Voting Behavior:

,

Not only do [elections] allow citizens to choose the government, but they
also restrain political leaders who must behave in a way that maximizes their
chances of reelection. Elections are thus one means of linking public
attitudes with governmental policy. In addition, electing a government is a
way of legitimizing its authority. Elections provide a peaceful means for
political change. And they permit individuals and groups to resolve their
conflicting needs peacefully. Along with this view of elections is a
corresponding view of voters as choosing intelligently among the
candidates. Although no one would argue that all voters are well informed,
the view from this perspective is that voters as whole make careful and
informee.:.choices:n

In 1949, Herman Finer, in his classic study The Theory and Practice of Modem
Government described this connection between democracy and elections:

The real question .. .is not whether the government decides to t.ak.e notice of
popular criticisms and votes, but whether it can be voted out of office or
forced by some machinery or procedures to change its policy, above all
against its own Will. 48
The remainder of this thesis will discuss these theories of congressional elections in
the context of the 1946, 1948, 1994 and 1996 congressional elections to see if the
relationship between congressional behaviors and congressional elections has changed in
the past 50 years. The similar election results in 1946 and 1994 followed by different

election results two years later, provide a context in which to reexamine congressional
election theories. After case studies on the Truman 1946-1948 period and the Clinton
{'/ Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg. Conrroversies in Voting Behavior 3rd ed. (Washington, DC:
Congressional Quanerly Press. 1993), I.
48 Fmer. as cited in L. Sandy Maisel, Pames and Electinns in America (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
1993), 1.
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1994-1996 period in Sections IT and ill, the Analysis Section will address several particular
congressional theories to detennine if they still apply to recent elections. More specifically,
the analysis will examine congressional theories addressing, incumbency advantage,
candidate-centered campaigns in congressional elections, explanations of midterm
elections, presidential coattails, and voter turnout. By examining the Truman presidency
and the 1946-1948 elections and comparing them to the Clinton presidency and the 1994
1996 elections, I will conclude wbether or not traditional congressional theories are still
applicable. Furthennore, I will analyze other factors that must be used to explain the
differences in these particular elections. or if in fact scholars of political science must
develop new theories with which to analyze recent congressional elections.

"

"
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II. Truman and the 80th Congress

The Wake of Roosevelt

On April 12, 1945, after just 82 days as Vice President, Harry S Truman succeeded
Franklin Delano Roosevelt becoming the 33 President of the United States.

Americans

were not only devast.ated by the loss of their New Deal champion FOR, but they were also
uncomfortable with the inexperienced., former Senator from Missouri assuming control of
the most irnponant executive position.

Some Americans have even gone so far as to

nickname him the "accidental president.,,49 Upon hearing about Roosevelt's death, a group
of reporters in Washington responded, "Good God, Truman will be President.'.so Truman

.:\

......

"'}..

himself was frightened. and scared, and even admitted to people that be was close to "I'm
not big enough for this job...51 In fact, while campaigning for the vice presidency in 1945,
Truman bad a nighonare that the sick FOR had died., and he became president.52 Just a few
months later, Truman's worst nightmare had come true.
The Truman presidency and the congressional elections of 1946 and 1948 must be
examined in the context of the political climate of the nation at that time.

As Truman

ascended the presidency in the wake of Roosevelt's death, the country was consumed by

its efforts to defeat the Nazi regime in Gennany and retaliate against the Japanese for
bombing Pearl Harbor.

Despite the unrest of the war, Americans felt secure in the

leadership of FOR. Their resilient leader had not only proven that he could rescue the
people from the devastations of the Depression, but he bad also been able to gain their

David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon & Shusler, 1992),523.
Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession (Baltimore: Penguin
Books, Inc., 1966), 1.
SI TruJ7Il»l [videorecording]. directed and produced by David Grubin; a David Grubin Productions. Inc. ftlm
for the American Experience (Atlanta, GA: Turner Home Entertainment.. Burbank.. CA: Distributed by
Warner Home Video, 1997).
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confidence and trust as a wartime leader. He was the fIrst president in history to be elected
to a third and fourth tenn (despite his deteriorating health). In 1944, people feared that
FOR would not live to complete his fourth tenn in office, thus the selection of the vice
president became increasingly important. The liberal Henry Wallace, former Secretary of
Agriculture under Roosevelt, and then vice president during FDR's third term, was
opposed by conservatives. Roosevelt's close friend and director of the Office of War
Mobilization, Jimmy Byrnes, was a possibility but was disliked by liberals because of his
labor and civil rights record. The division of the Democratic party led to the selection of

Harry Truman, the compromise candidate who was liked by southerners, had conservative
friends, and maintained labor contacts. Truman feared that he was not qualified enough to
be vice president, especially under the circumstances of Roosevelt's poor health. His wife
Bess was even less excited about the possibility of becoming First Lady. But Truman

,"
accepted and he and Roosevelt went on to sweep the election of 1944 with 432 electoral
votes and 53.4% of tbe popular vote.
In his 82 days as vice president, Truman kept outside of FDR's circle and met alone

with the president only twice.53 Truman barely knew the members of the Cabinet, and all
he knew about the war was what be read in the newspapers.

When Truman became

president, he knew nothing of the atomic bomb, the most powerful weapon known to
mankind, of which be had total control. "But by May, the war with Europe was nearly
over, and less than four months later he ended the war with Japan by deciding to drop the
bomb. Thus. after four months in office, Truman could for the first time direct his
anention to domestic issues.
Truman's most difficult challenge was managing the economic transition from war
to peace. While this assignment was more compatible with his experience and expertise
than was foreign policy, it proved politically much more damaging. His goal was to initiate
a smooth transition to civilian production without returning to the Great Depression and

53

Ibid.
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dangerous rates of inflation.54 His administration, however, had close relationships with
organized labor and decided to continue its wartime controls on prices, making Truman's
goal almost impossible.
From the end of the war through the ftrst half of 1946, the economy was plagued
by shortages of many consumer goods. While businessmen wanted to increase prices, the
adminisLration wanted to maintain control over them at wartime levels.

The

adminisLration's efforts to protect the consumer against inflation. tended to dry up supply
and force many transactions onto the black market, where a buyer paid high prices anyway.
Truman was tom between his inner liberalism and experience as a businessman, and after
some wavering. endorsed a one-year extension on price controls. Labor unions capitalized
on Trnman's decision and·began a series of strikes against businesses. the most damaging
being in May,
1946, when the railroad unions called a strike, putting the country at a
.,
standstill. 55 Truman infuriated labor leaders by suggesting negotiations and arbitrations as
an interim solution. He further exacerbated his standing with labor by forcing a settlement
to the strike by asking Congress to give him temporary power to draft strikers into the
army.

Despite all of the strikes, there was at least one positive outlook on the economy;
the depression that people had feared had not come. In fact, employment was high, money
was plentiful, and business was booming. 56 But, this encouragement was darkened by the
cost of living which had jumped 6 1/2 percentage points since the end of 1945.

In

addition, there were still acute shortages of materials people wanted such as housing,
automobiles, refrigerators, nylon stockings, sugar, coffee, and meat.S7
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The 1946 Election and Republican Sweep of Congress

By the fall of 1946, Truman's approval rating had fallen from 87% (in June 1945)
to 32% (in September 1946).58 The public in general perceived him as unable to handle his
domestic responsibilities. His popularity plummeted and his reputation was soon tainted
by the slogan "to err is Truman. ,,59 Furthermore, his arbitrations with the strikes had
alienated the liberal supporters of labor, usually strong Democratic partisans in elections.
While Truman was not up for election in 1946, his popularity was so low that the
.Democratic National Comminee chairman, Bob Hannegan , advised that Truman refrain
from campaigning for his party in the congressional elections.
The Republicans seized the opportunily of the vulnerable Democratic party to win
\'
" ~control of the Congress as they blamed the President for the country's problems. Few
Democrats even mentioned Truman's name during the campaign, and some even resoned
to playing old recordings of Roosevelt speeches to help boost their chances. 60

The

Democratic congressional campaign as a whole was lackadaisical, almost expecting to
follow historical trends of midterm elections in which the president's party has
continuously lost seats. In the fall of 1946, Henry M. Frost Advertising Agency (Boston)
coined the two word campaign slogan for the Republican congressional candidates: "Had
enough?"61
The Republican slogan worked, and on November 5. 1946 the Republicans took
control of both houses of Congress for the first time in 18 years. 62 The 1946 elections
showed an increased turnout from the previous midterm, with 37.1 % of the voting age
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population going to the polls.63 Republicans not only took substantial control of both
houses, but they also took control of a majority of state governorships.64 In the House, 52
incumbents, 48 of whom were Democrats, lost in their bids for reelections. In the Senate,
seven incumbents, all Democrats were defeated. Cabell Phillips, in his history of the
Truman presidency, described four factors leading to the Republican landslide of 1946.
First, Phillips noted that the Democrats had been in power for· years, and it was time for a
pendulum swing; second, Americans became impatient with the postwar uncertainties as
they readjusted back to peace; third., the Roosevelt coalition of southern conservatives, big
city machines, labor, and minority groups, which had been glued. together by the reforms
of the New Deal and held together by the necessities of war, was beginning to come
undone; and fmally, the Truman administration's handling of situations including
negotiations between labor and management, dealing with the strikes, inflation, black
~,~

~

markets, and price control, and Truman's inability to work with Cabinet officials and
Congress, had made Americans weary of supporting a Democratic congress. 6S

The 80th "Do-Nothing" Congress: Truman on the rebound

Cabell Phillips describes Truman's rerum to Washington after the election:
Probably no President since Andrew Johnson bad run out of prestige and
leadership more thoroughly than had Harry Truman when he returned
almost unnoticed to Washington on that bleak, misty November morning in
1946. 66
But Truman was not discouraged and was determined to establish himself as a forceful
leader by building a platform on which to campaign for reelection. Describing his reactions

Ornslein. Mann. Malbin. Vital Statistics on Congress 1997-1998. 50. Note that turnout is based on
percentage of voting age population voting in US House elections.
~ Ibid.
6S Phillips. The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession, 160.
66 Ibid .. 161.
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to the election in a letter to his wife Bess, Truman explained, ''I'm doing as I damn please
for the next two years, and to hell with the rest of them. ,,67
The Republican 80th Congress however, was equally ambitious and energized after

16 years as the minority. The House membership of the 80th Congress consisted of 101
freshmen (26 Democrats and 75 Republicans), including, Richard Nixon (R-CA) and John

F. Kennedy (D-MA). Joe Martin (R-MA) replaced Sam Rayburn as Speaker of the House,
and the leadership in the House consisted of a large percentage of anti-New Deal
conservatives. As Alonzo Hamby explained in his biography of Truman:
Finnly entrenched in the party leadership by vinue of long seniority,
enjoying a comfortable margin of party superiority, and ideologically
compatible with the southern Democrats on many issues. the House
Republicans were more openly partisan. very conservative, and
combative.68
"

"

The Senate of the 80th Congress was more moderate with a narrower margin of
Republican control. Alben Barkley (D-KY) was replaced as Majority Leader by Wallace
H. White of Maine. Known as more of a negotiator than a debater, White was not really
the leader of the majority party. He was self-effacing in the presence of more JX>litically
powerful Senators, like Robert Taft (R-OH) and Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) who tacitly
agreed to run the Senate, dividing responsibilities between the domestic agenda and foreign
affairs, respectively.69 New faces in the Senate included Henry Cabot Lodge. Jr. (R-MA)
and Joseph McCarthy (R-WI).
On January 6,1947, in his State of the Union address, Truman called on members
of Congress to "work together despite the honest differences of opinion. ,,70

He

emphasized five points in his address: first, harmonious relations between management and
labor; second., I.he restriction of monopoly and encouragement of free enterprise; third, I.he .
Truman (videoreeording).
Alonzo L. Hamby. Man of the People: A Life of Harry S TrumtlTl (New York: Oxford University
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continued fostering of home construction; fourth, the balancing of the budget; and fifth, the
achieving of fair income for farmers. 71

Other controversial programs that had been

introduced in the past were reintroduced in Truman's State of the Union address, including
compulsory health insurance, the protection of civil rights, and a national fair employment
practices act. 72 Just a few days later, Truman sent his federal budget proposal to Congress,
asking for approved expenditures of $37.5 billion for fiscal year 1948. The GOP of the
80th Congress was excited about the opponunity for retribution after 14 years of
Democratic governing. The Republicans now had two years to reform the Roosevelt
legacy with hopes not only of keeping control of the Congress, but also of recapturing the
presidency itself.

In dealing with foreign policy. Truman and members of Congress joined as allies
against the Soviet Union Army. The common fear of the Soviet spread of communism
blurred the differences between the Democratic executive and Republican legislature in
handling foreign affairs. Truman believed in supporting free countries and preventing the
spread of communism, but realized that he needed the support of both the American people
and Congress before he acted. First he convinced the people that the possibility of global
Soviet influence was reason to be frightened.

Once Americans followed, Truman then

appealed to members of Congress, by explaining how the United States was being
threatened and the world was-being divided into the free people and the totalitarian enslaved
people, and then asking which side they were on. 73

The civil war in Greece and

communist pressures in Turkey led to the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, approved
by Congress on May 15, 1947, which provided a political commitment of $4 million to
aide Greece and Turkey. An economic commitment was also suggested by Secretary of
State George Marshall, and approved April 2, 1948. The Marshall Plan, as it became
known, was an economic plan that provided $13 billion to western Europe who had been
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devastated economically during the war.

Fearing that these nations would fall to the

Communists, the U.S. wanted to help pump money into European economies so that they
would purchase American food and goods. Truman's popularity increased. as the American
people enjoyed the benefits of baving the government pay the U.S. economy to help
Europe.
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Arthur Vandenberg was a key
player in the bipartisan foreign policy negotiations during the 80th Congress. Prior to the
attack on Pearl Harbor, Vandenberg was known by his colleagues as an isolationist who
opposed much of the New Deal and American involvement in World War II. 74 After the
war, he emerged as an advocate of close cooperation between the legislative and executive
branches of government as well as between both parties.

He became a champion of

bipartisan foreign policy. leading his committee to unanimous votes in favor of the Aid to
~!

-..;;J}

Greece and Turkey proposal, approval of the Marshall Plan, and the Rio Treaty of Mutual
Assistance with Latin American Countries.
As the old adage goes, "partisanship ends at the water's edge."

Without the

corronon Soviet enemy, there was significantly less bipartisanship when dealing with the
domestic agenda. As Truman biographer, Alonzo L. Hamby noted:
The Republicans, mostly cooperating with him [Truman} on foreign policy.
would spend the next year and a half hurling themselves at his domestic
program with abandon and an apparent lack of understanding of the way in
which they were weakening themselves for the 1948 election.75
The Democratic President and Republican Congress generally were at loggerheads as
presidential recommendations to extend the New Deal social welfare concepts in the fields
of education, housing, medicare, and social security were largely ignored by Congress.
The most significant single piece of domestic legislation brought forth by the Republican
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controlled Congress in 1947 was the Taft-Hartley Act, which outlawed the closed shop,
made unions liable for breach of contract, prOhibited political contributions from unions.
required them to make fmancial reportS, and required their leaders to take a non-rommunist
oath. After two weeks·of deliberations, Truman vetoed the bill, calling it "an mack on the
workingman," and saying that he "wanted to bring labor back into Democratic politics,"
though all but two members of his Cabinet urged him to sign 11.76 The bill was eventually
approved by the Congress over President Truman's veto, on June 23, 1947. Throughom
the 80th Congress there were 75 presidential vetoes, of which only six were overridden by
Congress. 77

The Republican assault against some of FDR's accomplishments did

however, provide an opportunity for Truman

to

cast himself as a protector of treasured

programs rather than as an advocate for more change. The end of economic controls and
easing of most consumer shortages allowed him to take credit for prosperity rather than the
early blame he received from. inflation and scarcity. Truman used this momentum as a
catalyst to boost his popularity before the 1948 election.

The 1948 Election and Democratic Revival

Early 1948 proved devasLating for the President.

By late spnng, Truman's

popularity was so low that his own party was considering another nominee, such as Gen.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, to head the Democratic ticket. But Eisenhower refused to consider
seeking or accepting the nomination, and much to the dismay of his many admirers, said

that be "had no political ambitions.,,78

Liberals were disappointed in the anti-Soviet

orientation of the Truman administration and the coolness towards liberal domestic
programs and organized labor. 79 Southern Democrats were increasingly concerned with
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the liberal direction of the Democratic Party in support of African-Americans and organized
labor. so

Thus, the 1948 presidential race became hotly contested, with candidates

representing all factions of the Democratic Party in the November election. The liberal
Democrats nominated Progressive Party candidate, Henry Wallace to challenge Truman in
1948.

Truman had so alienated the conservative Southern Democrats, that at the

convention, the Mississippi delegation and half of the Alabama delegation walked out in
protest. Southern Democrats were so frustrated that they formed the States' Rights Party,
bener known as the Dixiecrats, nominating Strom Thurmond, the governor from South
Carolina, to run against Truman. Despite Truman's unpopularity within his own party, he
went on to clinch the Democratic presidential nomination, and within a few minutes,
Truman turned the vice-presidential decision over to the delegates who nominated, fonner
Democratic Majority Leader in the Senate, Alben W. Barkley.
Truman's acceptance speech for the presidential nomination at 2 a.m. on July 15,
1948 ignited a spark that helped carry the Democrats through the November election.
Truman not only lashed out at the Republicans as "the party of special interests" that
"favors the privileged few and not the common everyday man," but he called for repeal of
the Taft-Hartley Act, criticized Congress for its failure to control prices or pass a housing
bill, and said that the approved tax reduction measure was a "Republican rich-man's tax
bill... 81 Truman went so far as to call Congress in for a Special Session to curb high prices.
increase the minimwn wage, liberalize immigration of displaced persons, and enact public
housing and aid to education. In doing so, he immediately placed. the Republicans on the
defensive and left them in a lose-lose situation in an election year. The GOP would either
comply with Truman's requests in which case Truman would claim credit., or they would
suffer the blame of denying Truman and the public some popular measures.

Slephen D. Shaffer, "Stales' Rights Party" in Political Panies arlL1 Elections in the United StLltes An
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The Republicans debared the proper response.

One alternative discussed was to

adjourn the session immediately, but Taft and his fellow Republicans did not want to seem
wholly negative, especially regarding the issue of inflation. The second alternative was to
meet Truman halfway. By that time, the Senate had already passed legislation to aid
education and public housing, and perhaps House Republicans would do the same. But
Republicans feared that this course of action would give the President credit for any
legislation passed. Therefore, the Republicans were forced to accept the one, remaining
option, which was to listen u> Truman's requests anddenounce them as politically inspired,
enact a few minor measures to address the salient issue of price controls, and go home as
soon as possible. Taft and his fellow Republicans carried out the third alternative, granting
Truman additional power to control consumer credit and to increase bank reserves, and
passing a bill liberalizing credit for private builders.
1=

Republicans did not respond to

~~

Truman's requests for an increase in the minimum wage, aid to education, displace
persons, or public housing, and ended the session after two weeks. Truman seized this
opportunity to catapult his reelection campaign, nicknaming the 80th Congress, the "Do
Nothing" Congress for their failure to meet his high expectations announced during his
nomination speech.
As noted above, in the presidential race, Truman faced not only the popular

governor from New York, Thomas E. Dewey, who had been the unsuccessful candidate
against Roosevelt in 1944, but also the liberal Henry Wallace from the Progressive Party,.
and Strom Thunnond representing the Southern conservative Democrats from the States'
Rights ("Dixiecrat") Party. Thus, President Truman's own Democratic Party had split
from both the left and Lhe right, leaving only the middle to support his reelection.

On September 17, 1948, Harry Truman set out on his "whistle stop" campaign
aboard a lrain, covering 31,000 miles appearing before an estimated six million people in
six weeks. He crisscrossed the country in his campaign train, targeting his talks toward the
dominant interests at any given stop. He reminded his audiences of the benefits they had
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received from the Democrats under Roosevelt, and expressed his detennination to defend
them from the Republicans. His battle cry became "Give-em-hell," as the "Do-Nothing"
Republican Congress became his chief target. ''When I called them back into session what
did they do? Nothing. Nothing. That Congress never did anything the whole time it was
in session," he said. If the Republicans win, he added, "They'll tear you apart."

The

Republicans are "predatory animals who don't care if you people are thrown into a
depression .. .They like runaway prices... 82 Truman gained momentum from his campaign
and his speeches grew increasingly effective with each stop. He was a great campaigner
and as a "quite ordinary man" he understood the American people. 83 Truman had become a
leader since the 1946 elections and was even encouraged to campaign for congressional
Democrats.
As the campaign came to a close, the movements by Wallace and Thurmond were
i·~

faltering.

. .

Wallace and his Progressive Party became increasingly identified with the

communists, and were accused of splitting the liberal vote, in addition to organizational
failures such as factionalism in some state organizations, and lack of ballot accessibility.84
These shortcomings led the liberals to desert Wallace for Truman.

As for Strom

Thurmond, his support from Southern governors and senators weakened, despite their
opposition to civil rights, and they too chose to support a major party candidate and backed
the President. As the election drew closer, many Southern Democrats supported Truman,
especially in areas with fewer African-Americans and where race was a less salient issue.
These Truman loyalists feared the loss of federal projects and patronage and a split in the
Democratic Party that would only help the Republicans. 8s Unlike Wallace, whose support
had consistently diminished throughout the country, Thurmond still had strong support
from a few states in the South that Truman hoped to win in November. Thus, in the final
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weeks before the election, despite some uncertainty in the Soutb, it was evident that the
presidential battle bad narrowed to a close fight between the Democrat Truman and the
Republican Dewey.
Dewey's campaign was not quite as exceptional as Trwnan's. He skirred the issues
and continuously repeated his call for "national unity. ,,86 Dewey called the 80th Congress
"one of the best" but failed to defend its individual programS.S7 Instead of highlighting the
accomplishments of the 80th Congress, refuting Truman's Do-Nothing" claim, and his
failures as the chief executive, Dewey was determined to adhere to his own strategy ,88
Despite weak campaign tactics, Dewey was popular with the people and was confident in a
victory over Truman.

He was assured by pollsters, campaign strategists, advertising

consultants, and newsmen that he would win.

Even in the last week of the campaign, the

Gallup polls favored a Dewey victory with 49.5% of the popular vote to 44.5% for
.:

Truman.

.....itt,.'"}
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On election day, November 2, 1948, Harry Truman went to sleep before all of the
ballots had been counted. He was the only one who thought he would win.

Not one

pollster, newspaper, or reporter had predicted the outcome of the election. The day after
the election the headlines of the Chicago Tribune read. "Dewey Beats Truman ... 90 Truman,
however, did triumph over Dewey in the closest presidential race since 1916. 91

He

captured 49.5% of the popular vote (only a plurality, not a majority) and won 303 electoral 
votes in 28 states. Dewey secured 16 states and 189 electoral votes, with 45.1 % of the
popular vote, and Thurmond and Wallace each only won a disappointing 2.4% of the
popular vote. With only minimal support throughout the country, Wallace did not cany
any states, and thus did not secure any electoral votes.
about

Thurmond, however, had won

me same number of votes. but they were heavily concentrated in the South.

Thus, he
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won 4 states (Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Louisiana), and secured 39
electoral votes. 92 In addition to his reelection, Truman helped carry the Democrats back
into control of both the House and the Senate, with the largest turnaround in modern
congressional history ,93
The results of the 1948 congressional election were directly affected by the
presidential race. Democrats took back control of both the House and the Senate bringing
the makeup of the 81st Congress to 263 Democrats, 171 Republicans and one Independent
in the House, and 54 Democrats, 42 Republicans in the Senate. 94 In all the states that had

senatorial races in 1948. except Massachusetts, either Truman or Thurmond helped.to carry
the Democratic senatorial candidate as well. While comparable data are not available at the
congressional district level, it seems likely that voters followed party line there too.
Senator Taft blamed the election results on Dewey's "uninspiring campaign."95 As James
Patterson explained, Taft claimed that Dewey could have won the election and the
Republicans could have remained in control:
The result of the election- was a tragedy, largely because it was entirely
unnecessary. Dewey could have won, and we could have elected. a
Republican Congress if the right kind of campaign had been put on. I am
absolutely certain that Dewey could have won if be had put up any kind of
fight at all and dealt with the issues before the people.96
Post election data showed that Dewey received a poor showing from GOP regulars in rural
farm regions, suggesting his weakness among the party faithful.
Truman however) ran an energetic campaign that not only brought him a victory,
but carried coattails that cost the Republicans 74 House seats and nine seats in the Senate,

McCullough. Truman, 7) 0- 711.
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regaining both Democratic majorities. Congressional Democrats were certainly bolstered
by Truman's vehement attacks on the Republican Congress.

When asked for an

explanation of his phenomenal victory, Truman answered: "Labor did it.,,97 When it was
evident that Wallace's support had weakened, most of organized labor coalesced behind the
President before the election. 98 Other election observers explain Truman's victory not orily
based on labor. but also on his efforts to blame the 80th Congress for falling farm prices. 99

In addition, Truman benefited from I.he recent voter constituency that had elected Roosevelt
and joined the Democratic parry.l00

At that time, a Republican who hoped to win

nationwide support needed not only regular party voters, but also needed to appeal to
independents, ethnic voters, urbanites, blacks, and unionists, all of which formed a
powerful coalition that elected Roosevelt four times. lOt
Congressional Democrats did not owe all of their election success to Truman
-:
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however. The Democrats had been developing strategies to oust Republicans since they
lost control in 1946. 102 Congressional Democrats were actively supported not only by
Truman, but also by the organized labor movement. Democratic unity had been created.
throughout the country in mayoral races up through congressional races.

Unlike the

presidential race in which Thurmond's success in the South clearly hurt Truman,
congressional Democrats did not suffer any losses within the House or Senate, separating
them from the rest of their party. In all four states won by Thurmond, all Democratic
congressional candidates were elected, again emphasizing the 'Solid Democratic strength in
the South despite the factions in the presidential race.

In the four years after Truman took over the presidency, he metamorphosed from a
timid politician with little executive experience into a commanding leader of the Democratic
party. This change not only helps to explain his reelection success in 1948, but also the
Congress and the Nation 1945-1964 A Review o/Government and Politics in the Post War Years. 8.
Stephen D. Shaffer, "Progressive Pany." 886.
99 Congress and the Nation 1945-1964 A Review o/Government aruJ Politics in rhe Post War Year, 8.
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results of the congressional elections in both 1946 and 1948.

In 1946, Truman's low

popularity made him shy away from campaigning for his party, and the Democrats lost
control of the Congress. But, the postwar political climate quickly changed from one of
economic instability and fear of Soviet influence, to one 'of economic prosperity and
American dominance in foreign policy, thereby creating an environment for Democratic
success in 1948.

'J
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III. Clinton and the l04th Congress

1992-1994:

Unified Government

The 1992 elections reesr.ablished unified government for the fIrst time since the
Carter Administration in the late 1970s.

William Jefferson Clinton" the 46 year old

governor from Little Rock, Arkansas ran an unconventional campaign to secure the
executive seaL Throughout the campaign Clinton was adored by his supporters much like
the vibrant John F. Kennedy in 1960. Clinton stretched his campaign across the country
appealing to liberals, young voters, and southerners.

He made appearances on The

Arsenio Hall Show, and submitted to interviews on The Phil Donihue Show and MTV. In
i?

4

addition, Clinton's wife Hillary appeared on the Today show and LIVE With Regis and
Kathy Lee. Like Harry Truman, Clinton also had his own "whistle stop" campaign as he
toured the country by bus. His zealous campaign proved successful as Clinton defeated
incumbent President Bush and Independent candidate Ross Perot with 370 electoral votes,
and 43% of the popular vote.
Democrats throughout the country were excited and optimistic about their new,
Washington-outsider, refonn-minded leader working with a Democratic congress.
Clinton's campaign theme song, "Don't Stop Thinking About Tomorrow" by Fleetwood
Mac guided him into the White House as he played the saxophone with his favorite 1970s
band at his Inaugural Ball. In addition, in the wake of the House Bank. scandal, the 1992
congressional elections resulted in the exchange of a fourth of the lawmakers on Capitol
Hill. tO ) Furthennore, the new Congress was comprised of record numbers of women,
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blacks and Hispanics, leaving Democrats finn1y in control of the executive and legislative
branches. 104
Despite the unified Democratic control, Clinton's inexperience with politics and
politicians in Washington would prove to be his most challenging obstacle in his ftrst two
years in office. Clinton quickly realized that he knew few coogresspersons, press corps
members, and had only an amateur sense of how power flowed in the nation's capitol. In
addition, despite his popularity among Democrats, Clinton won the presidency with one of
the slenderest mandates in history. No one in Congress owed their victory to Clinton; there
were only ftve congressional districts in which Clinton received more votes than the
congressperson, and only 91 congressional districts in which Clinton received more than a
majority. Clinton would face great difficulty in getting support from members of Congress
since virtually no one owed him their electoral success.

U

Furthermore, even during the

...;i;

campaign, both the public and members of Congress questioned Clinton's character and
integrity as rumors were reported about an affair with Gennifer Flowers, experimentation
with marijuana, and efforts to avoid the draft during the Vietnam War.
Clinton appeared undeterred in the beginning of his presidency, despite his
inexperience and unfamiliarity with Congress.

He was aggressive in putting forth

legislation, sometimes spreading his political resources too thinly by trying to focus on too
many issues at once. Just six months into his term, Clinton's approval ratings began to
decline, and for most of his second year in office, his public opinion polls were below
50%.105

Clinton however, did have a solid record in passing legislation, gaining

Congress' support 86% of the time, the best legislative record since Lyndon Johnson's
nearly 30 years ago. 106 But Clinton's victories were darkened by some highly publicized
defeats. The president put enormous effort into health care reform, which died in August
1994, before Congress had the opportunity to vote on it. A major piece of crime legislation
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was delayed when House Democrats sided with Republicans on a procedural vote. Later in
1994, crime legislation eventually passed, but the setbacks overshadowed the victories.

In addition to Clinton's legislative defeats, questions continued to linger about his
character and competence as the COUDtry'S executive leader. Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R
NY) proceeded with allegations about the Whitewater land deal, attacking the president's

honesty and character, as well as the integrity of certain administrative officials who were
later forced to resign. The problems during Clinton's flrst two years in office exacerbated
feelings that the public already had about their leader. By mid-October of 1994, just a
month before the midterm election, the president's approval ratings dropped to 38% among
men and 44% among women. 107
Not only were the people skeptical about Clinton, but they were also losing
confidence in the institutions of national government. In March 1994, surveys by the
~,~
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Gallup organization showed that only a mere 18% of citizens expressed "a great deal" of
confidence in Congress, compared to 39% in 1985 and 42% in 1973. 108 Given the theories
of midterm elections discussed earlier, the 1994 congressional elections were inevitably
going to take a loll on the Democrats.

The 1994 Republican Revolution

In the context of a highly decenlra1ized American political system, the Republicans
made an attempt to avoid the candidate-centered campaign style for the 1994 congressional
elections and instead nationalized the elections on a set of themes to bind all candidates
together. Under the aegis of two aggressive House Republican leaders, Newt Gingrich
,.

(GA), the Minority Whip, and Richard Armey (TX), the Conference Chair, House staff
compiled a package of legislative proposals calling it the "Contract wilb America" They
were meticulous in their design to attract the attention of the increasing majority of people
107

108
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dissatisfied with the President. the Congress. and the government. A key component of
the sales pitch was a promise to place each agenda item at the top of the Republican
legislative calendar during the first 100 days of a Republican-led l04th Congress. I09
Issues included in the Contract varied. from term limits, to crime,
deregulation and deficit reduction.

[0

welfare reform. to

Republican leaders wisely shied. away from

controversial social issues such as school prayer and abortion, not wanting to divide the
party.
Republicans sought to bring about party responsibility by inviting voters to "throw
them out" if they failed to deliver on their Contract promises. lIO The Contract provided
both incumbent and novice candidates wiLh a ready-made platform that contained issues
important to the American people. Most Republican candidates chose the items in the
Contract that would most appeal to their constituencies and tailored their campaign
~,~

~.

messages to focus on specific items rather than on the document itself. In addition to the
individual candidate's campaign themes, Republicans highlighted the Contract as a national
campaign theme on the steps of the Capitol on September 27, 1994 by signing the
document.
The success of the Republican Contract as a campaign theme. was additionally
helped by detrimental factors in the Democratic congressional races. First, Democrats who
anacl:\ed themselves closely with the unpopular president were inevitably doomed. for defeat
in the midterm election.

Several entrenched Democrats were defeated because of a

controversial vote they casted in suppon of the president's agenda. Second, scandals hurt
some congressional Democrats even before the 1994 election.
Despite the enthusiastic efforts by Republicans and challenges faced by Democrats.
few politicians. journalists, or political scientists predicted the magnitude of the Republican
earthquake that would shake the nation on November 8, 1994. The Republicans swept
control of both houses of Congress for the ftrst time since 1953 during the Eisenhower
109
110
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administration. Net gains for the Republicans in the House were 52 and in Lbe Senate were
eight. Thirty-four Democratic incumbents were defeated in the House (plus four who lost
in the primaries) and two in Lbe Senate, while no Republican governors, senators or

representative incumbents were defeated.

Dealignment in the historically Democratic

South, also helped the Republicans, although the Democratic candidates who did win in the
region, were more liberal than any time prior to 1992. Redistricting after the 1990 Census
has been used to explain, not only the changes in the South, but also the Republican sweep
across the country.111 Furthermore, expecting losses, the Democrats left many uncontested
seats; for the fIrst time in the post war world, the DemocratS conceded more uncontested
seats (34) than the Republicans (13) in the general election. lI2
Voter turnout in the 1994 House elections was 36.0%, the highesl midterm turnout
since 1982. 113 Not surprisingly, more registered Republicans went to the polls in 1994
i:
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than did ~gistered Democrats. I 14

Republicans scored the biggest gains among

independents and men, winning more support in much higher proportions than previous
years. ll5 Men favored Republicans 54% of the time, and showed only 46% suppon for
Democrats. 116 In addition, 56% of those who identified themselves as independents voted
for Republicans, as opposed to 44% who voted for Democrats. 11 7 Furthermore, in the
1994 elections, Born-Again Christians represented 20% of the voters and voted three to

one in favor of Republicans. I IS Thus, the makeup of the l04th Congress included new
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Republicans who on average, were more conservative than their outgoing predecessors,
and the remaining Democrats who were more liberal. 1 19
The day after the election, President Clinton held a news conference in which he
summarized what he thought the voters who went to the polls were telling him:
Look, we just don't like what we see when we watch Washington. And
you haven't done much about that. It's too partisan, too interest-group
oriented, things don't get done. There's too many people up there playing
politics. Democrats are in charge. We are holding you accountable and we
hope you hear this, Mr. President. 120
Clinton offered three explanations for I.be results. First, he explained that the public was
dismayed at Washington business as usual, from lobbying to campaign spending to
partisanship.

Since I.be Democrats were in charge, the public held the president

responsible.

Second, the president cited skepticism by the public about whether the

administration htid really dope what it claimed about crime and the deficits. Even if it had,
people still felt insecure about their incomes, job stability, safer neighborhoods, etc.
Finally, Clinton heard the public saying, 'We don't think the government can solve all the
problems and we don't want the Democrats telling

US

from Washington that they know

what is right about everything."l21 According to a New York Times article two days after
the election, Republicans viewed the 1994 congressional election results as a "historic
victory" in which the voters embraced "Republican ideas of smaller government, lower
taxes. and more individual freedom and _personal responsibility. instead of more
government power and government responsibility."122
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The l04th Congress

Like Harry Truman in 1946, President Clinton, previously nicknamed the
"Comeback Kid," was also ready to face the new Republican congress.

The staunch

Republican ideologues elected in 1994 provided Gimon with an opportuni[y to reinvent
himself before the 1996 election. He would need to become the "moderate New Democrat"
he once promised. courting moderate Republicans. 123

In addition, he would need to

"morph" into as Gloria Borger described as "a president of principles, pushing for political
reform and vetoing bad legislation.

n124

Now Clinton had an enemy to demonize, and he

had the ability to challenge conservatives to bipartisan debate. Like Truman, Clinton could

"dare the Republicans to take yes for an answer" on such issues as a world trade agreement
and the budget. 125 This became Bill Ointon' s mission during his next two years.
if

4

The l04tb Congress was headed by Speaker Newt Gingrich, who assumed the
position from Tom Foley (D-WA), who not only lost his leadership position, but more
surprisingly lost his seat in the House.

Gingrich brought about a new definition of the

speakership. He added to his position of institutional power, a platform for revolutionary
leadership as the Congress in 1995 became an institution more active, more partisan and
more willing to defy a president than ever before. 126
The firSt session of the l04th Congress opened with a marathon 14 1/2 hour
session. 127 Between the election and the convening Congress, a Task Force led by Newt
Gingrich further organized the Republican agenda.

On the first day alone, the House

approved internal rule changes, eliminating committees and subconunittees, cutting
committee staff by one-third, imposing term limits on committee chairmen, subcommittee
chainnen and the Speakership. The House continued to work with similar speed, as the
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Republicans made the bold attempt to fulfill their campaign promise by voting on all items

in the Contract within the fIrst 100 days. While they were successful in bringing all of
legislation to the floor for a vote, they were less successful in enacting the legislation into
law.
Within 100 days, the House passed eight of the ten contraCt planks and the bulk of
the ninth plank. These included. a balanced budget constitutional amendment, a line-item
veto, changes in welfare and legal systems, a tax cut and a curb on unfunded mandates.
Term limits on members of Congress however, did not pass through the House.

The

Senate was more passive in its fIrst 100 days, primarily because only one-third of its
members were elected to the same mandate as the House in 1994. In addition, the Senate
djd not adopt the Contract with America, thus it took action on only a few of the its items.
The Senate failed to approve a balanced budget amendment. and only voted to support the
:'~
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preface of the contraet and one piece of a plank. The only legislation to be signed by
President Clinton in the flfSt 100 days was a law applying federal labor laws to members of
Congress and a bill curbing unfunded mandates to the states.
After the fIrst 100 days, the congressional pace slowed down significantly. Late in
the summer of 1995 was a turning point at which Republicans began to slide after months

in which the GOP and its contract agenda seemed unstoppable, especially in the House.
By late summer, the Democrats began to set the agenda. Debate in the fall was focused
around budget negotiations between the White House and Congress. The result of a tense
standoff between Clinton and the GOP majority in Congress was a government shutdown
from November 14-19. By that time, Congress had completed work on just five of the
spending bills. The second closure began on Dec. 16, when three spending bills were still
stalled in Congress and three more had been vetoed. 128

Republicans underestimated

Clinton's willingness to fight. They hoped the debate would be a redefming of I.be role of
the federal government bur was instead seen by the public as a "silly, schoolyard brawl
'~lbid.,
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over whether to keep the government operating while the two sides negotiated over the
budget. ,,129

The GOP lost control of debate, while White House and once passive

congressional Democrats grew more copfident in attacking GOP priorities. Opinion polls
that favored the GOP Congress earlier in the year were decreasing.

By November,

Congress' job performance rating on the budget was just 21 % and its disapproval rating
was 71 %, according to an ABC-Washington Post survey.l30
The 104th Congress ended its first session with little of their ambitious agenda
actually having succeeded in becoming law.

The Republicans took over Congress,

envisioning a smaller government, but by the end of 1995 no federal departments had been
eliminated and no long-standing social policies had been reshaped. The session ended
without budget resolution, after a budget reconciliation bill was vetoed and negotiations
between Congress and the White House showed no signs of significant progress.

In

addition, the session ended facing the possibility of months of gridlock, with the
Democratic White House and the prospect of having only Republican slogans, not
accomplishments, to present to restive voters in the 1996 elections. By the end of the ftrst
session, 88 bills passed and became public laws, and 11 bills were vetoed by the President.
Clinton only signed 85 of the bills, as one veto was overridden, and the other two became
laws because the President did not take action within the alloned 10 days. The ftrSt session
of the 100th Congress produced the lowest legislative output during any congressional
session since 1933. 131
The confrontation which ended the first session of the 104th Congress led to
compromise in the second session. Politicians on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue were
ready to talk. The public's blame of the GOP for the budget debacle sealed the GOP's
transformation and the end of hard-line tactics. The "Contract with America," which led
the Republican revolution in the first session, was rarely mentioned in 1996. The second
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session of the l04th Congress was highlighted by the passage of substantial legislation and
changes in some of the nation's long-standing social policy programs.

Furthermore, in

June of 1996, Majority Leader Robert Dole (R-KS) resigned from the Senate to campaign
full time for the Republican presidential nomination.

Speaker Gingrich cirarn3tical1y changed his "all-or-nothing tactics" from the first
session and played a different role in 1996.132 He and Majority Leader Armey. shared the
leadership, with Armey running the clay-to-day operations of the floor and Gingrich
plotting election strategy for the fall and stepping in to resolve disputes when necessary,
Democrats in the second session of the 104th Congress played the role of the minority,
nying to slow or alter GOP initiatives. By spring, they became more aggressive and put
GOP leaders on the defensive,
The l04th Congress and Ointon were much more successful with their legislative

U

...;£

agenda in 1996 than the proceeding year. The White House and Congress agreed on an
overhaul of the nation's welfare system which ended the federal guarantee of cash benefits
to the poor; rewrote telecommunications law that affected a multitude of companies in the
rapidly changing communications industry; remade agriculture policy which promised to
diminish agriculture's reliance on federal subsidies; increased fPe minimum wage; and gave
the president the power of the line-item veto.
. The second session of the 104th Congress passed significantly more legislation
than had the first session.

By the end of 1996, 245 bills had been signed into law,

bringing the total during the 104th Congress to 333. 133 Clinton vetoed six bills during the
second session, of which only one was overridden, bringing the total number of vetoes in
the l04th Congress to 17!:YI. James A. Thurber, an American University congressional
scholar, described the end of Lhe l04th Congress: "I think that this Congress will be known

m Congressional Quanerly Almanac /996. Vol. LIT (Washington, DC: Congressional Quanerly Inc..
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133 Congressional Quarterly Almanac /996. 1-5.
134 Ibid.

43

a one in which the majority came in as revolutionaries and left as pragmatislS."135 By end
of 1996, bipartisanship had led to political success, thus the winners heading in to 1996
elections were incumbents, which boded well for both congressional Republicans and
Clinton.

The 1996 Election: More of the Same

In the 1996 Democratic primary, the unopposed incumbent Bill Clinton easily
secured the nomination. Former Senate Majority Leader, Bob Dole, eventually secured the
Republican nomination, although it took more time, effort, and financial resources than
most had originally expected. 136 Dole continuously trailed Clinton in the polls throughout
the general election campaign.
:,~
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However his ratings did increase briefly after the

Republican National Convention in which his wife Elizabeth Dole rallied the party. and he
announced that his vice-presidential candidate would be Jack Kemp.
Clinton's successful campaign slrategies from 1992 proved effective again in 1996;
his campaign was also aided by the strong economy and relative international calm. The
president' s campaign was not a change-oriented agenda as it had been in 1992, but rather
one in which he took credit for the status quo and success of ills first term. He highlighted
the economy: four years of low inflation, the drop in the unemployment rate from 7% in
1992 to 5% in 1996, steady economic growth, and a reduction in the annual budget deficit
from $290 billion the year before he became president to $106 billion in the fourth year of
his term. 137 In addition, he revived his presidency by moving to the center as a moderate.
He accepted the Republican goals to balance the budget by 2002, declared that the "end of
big government is over," and signed a bill to end the welfare entitlements that bad been part
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of the social safety net since the New Deal.

His strategy was to present himself as

presidential rather than as a partisan or political figure; thus he did little campaigning for his
fellow Democrats in Congress, despite his constant lead in the poUs.
Just as Clinton claimed credit for the successful economy and status quo, so did
congressional Republicans. Unlike 1994, congressional Republicans did not make any
attempts to campaign on the Contract, or even to try to nationalize the election.

The

political quagmire that resulted at the end of the first session in the l04th Congress quickly
changed the way in which congressional Republicans portrayed themselves to their
constituents; they no longer linked themselves to either Gingrich or the Contract. Had they
stuck together throughout the 100th Congress, the 1996 election may have been a
referendum on their coUective performance as a party.

Instead, potentially vulnerable

Republicans did what Democrats had routinely done to retain their seats during their forty
~>~
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year tenure: run as "independent champions of local district mterests.',138
Congressional Democrats were hun in the 1996 elections by the success of divided
government during the 100th Congress compared to the failures of unified government
during Clinton's first two years in office. Furthermore, Ointon' s lack of effort to lengthen
his presidential coattails when his support ratings were so favorable proved to the public
that electing a democratic majority in 1996 was not on the top of Clinton's campaign
agenda.

Thirty-one Democrats voluntarily left the House in 1996, compared to 22

Republicans. In the Senate, eight Democrats retired, four of whom were from the South,
compared to six Republicans. The minority status for the Democrats in Congress favored
Republican victories in these open seats. As the minority party, the Democrats also had a
more difficult time recruiting strong candidates to run and procuring contributions from

political action committees.

ReCently. many potentially strong candidates opt out of

)38 Gary C. Jacobson, "'The lOSth Congress: Unprecedented and Unsurprising," in The Elections of 1996,
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running for Congress, particularly if they belong to the minority pany.139 Many potentially
strong candidates shy away from running due to the daunting task of raising money, not
only for the fU'St campaign but for subsequent campaigns; family concerns; a sense that
they could make more of a difference in local politics and avoid Washington; and
frustration that the mechanic of campaigning was more important that the issues. This is
true even if they seem to have a decent chance of succeeding. 140
The results of the elections on November 5, 1996 were not surprising.

As

expected, incumbent President Bill Clinton swept to victory, as did the Republican majority
in Congress. Voter turnout in the presidential race was 49%, the lowest since 1924. 141
Clinton won 49% of the popular vote to Dole's 41 % and Perot's 8%, along with 379
electoral votes to Dole's 159. Ointon's less than majority support made him the "fIrst two
term president of either party since Woodrow Wilson, in the 1910s, not to win a majority
:.~
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of the popular vote in either of his victories, and the only one never to receive at least four
hundred electoral votes.,,142
As for the congressional races, incumbents did well as 95% of senators and 95% of
representatives who sought reelection were successfuL 14J In the Senate, the Republicans
won three of the seats left open by departing Democrats, two in the South (Alabama and
Arkansas) and one in Nebraska. a state won by Dole. The only Republican defeat in the
Senate was in South Dakota, in which the incumbent lost in the general election to the at
large representative.144 The new senators moved the congressional wing of the Republican
13~ Richard L. Berke. "Run for Con~? Parties Find Rising Stars Are JUSl Saying No," The New York
Times. March 15.1998, AI; Elizabeth Arnold, ''Running From Congress," Radio interview. All Things
Considered. April 2.1998. L. Sandy Maisel. Walter J. Stone, Kendra Ammann. Elizabeth Ivry, Benjamin
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party even further to the right; both the three who replaced Democrats, and every one of the
nine replacing retiring Republicans are more conservative than his or her predecessor.
After the results were all tallied, the makeup of the 105th Senate was 55 Republicans to 45
Democrats.

In the House, the makeup of the 105th Congress was 227 Republicans, 207
Democrats, and one Independent.

Unlike the 1994 elections in which 34 democratic

incumbents were defeated, only five lost in 1996. Sixteen Republican incumbents lost, 13
of whom were freshmen targeted by the Democratic National Party and AH..-OO during
the campaign. In open seats, the Republicans won 29 of the 53 vacant seats, nine of which
had been given up by Democratic incumbents. Democrats won only three of the seats left
vacant by Republican incumbents. After two years of GOP control. the voters reelected a
Republican Congress, making it the fIrst time since 1930 that Republicans controlled both
~,~

~

chambers of Congress for more than two consecutive years. us
The frrst Clinton administration can be characterized by experimentation and
change. The President was elected in 1992 as a vibrant young politician, whom many
compared to John F. Kennedy.

But Ointon quickly realized that he was even less

experienced that JFK had been and that he would have to learn to adapt to Washington
politics.

His "learning experience" undoubtedly hurt the Democrats in the 1994

congressional election, as Republicans took control of Congress for the rust time in forty
years.

The beginning of the 104th Congress was marked with aggressive Republican

leadership attempting to fulfill a campaign promise through the Contract with America.
Despite numerous efforts, the RepUblicans were unsuccessful in signing into law much of
their Contract, and simultaneously suffered the consequences of their stubbornness during
the budget debate. The budget negotiations were the most significant factor shaping the
changes by both the White House and Congress in the second session. Politicians at both
ends of Pennsylvania Avenue learned to negotiate and compromise in order to bring about

14$
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bipartisan political reform.

The success of the legislation passed during the second

session, coupled by the strength of the economy, showed the voters the advantages of
divided government and asked for their support in 1996. The results of the presidential and
congressional elections in 1996 confIrm the continuation of a Democratic president and
Republican Congress for at least another two years, if not more.

"
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Analysis

Given the political framework of the Truman experience and the 80th Congress
between 1946-1948 and the Clinton experience and the l04th Congress dwing 1994-1996,
as discussed in Sections II and

m,

I will now analyze and compare lhese two

unprecedented time periods to test the hypotheses posed in the introduction. In order to
understand the relationship between congressional elections and congressional behaviors, I
will examine the similarities and differences during these two periods.

Similarities
U

...:i:

The greatest similarities during the two time periods occurred before the 1946 and
before the 1994 congressional elections. The lack of executive experience and long history
of democratic rule in Congress provided an opening for Republican dominance in the 1946
and 1994 congressional elections. In their first two years in office, Truman and Clinton
both lacked what Richard Neustadt calls, "presidential power" or "the power to
persuade."1-l6 In Neustadt's defmition he claims that powerful presidents, in their efforts to
persuade, must possess both professional reputation in dealing with Congress and other
Washington insiders, as well as public prestige. 147 Both Truman and Ointon had little
Washington experience in how to run the executive branch and deal with members of
Congress as well as minimal public prestige.
Truman had been a businessman whom no one had heard of until he was elected to
the Senate at age 50. Ten years later, he was President. His transition to the presidency
was made even more difficult not only because of his short, 82 day tenure as vice

1.16
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president, but also due to his limited contact with Roosevelt. Unlike most C?f the American
presidents, Truman had not been popularly elected. In addition, Truman was known as
"go along, get along, Harry" and had not taken a leadership role during his tenure in the
Senate. 148 Thus, he could not rely on his ties to Congress to strengthen his position.
Harry Truman ascended the presidency during World War II as an inexperienced leader
with great challenges to end the war and bring about a stable economy.

His lack of

executive experience was undoubtedly damaging to his fIrst year in office.
Similarly, Bill Clinton was also inexperienced as the national executive leader. As
the young governor from Arkansas, Clinton bad few close friends and mentors in
Washington. Unlike Truman however, Clinton was popularly elected to his office; yet he
still faced many obstacles in how to run and manage the country.

Having no previous

interaction with most members of Congress, Clinton struggled during his fIrst two years to
gain their respect. Furthermore, the Arkansas legislature was overwhelmingly dominated
by the Democrats, thus he lacked experience in dealing with a partisan political opposition

in Congress. In addition to the difficulties Clinton faced with members of Congress, he
also struggled to find strong individuals to comprise his staff and Cabinet

Many of

Clinton's close staff members were individuals who had helped run his campaign.
Clinton '5 experience as a long-term governor of a smalJ state did not translate well to
Washington.

Like Truman, Clinton struggled during his flfSt two years in office to

understand the position of the chief executive and become a Washington insider, while
simultaneously trying to push forth an ambitious agenda.
The inexperience of Truman and Clinton was even more noticeable when compared
to the politically experienced presidents that they succeeded. Truman replaced Roosevelt,

the longest serving president in U.S. history, who had recovered the country from the

Great Depression, established social services to provide for the public, and carried the
nation through World War IT. Similarly, Clinton's term followed 12 years of experienced
I~

Truman [videorecording].
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Republican executive leadership during the Reagan and Bush presidencies. Reagan led the
country during the height of the Cold War as the United States and Soviet Union built the
anns race to ensure that each country would remain a world superpower. After eight years
as vice president, George Bush stepped in to the presidency to continue the Reagan legacies
seeing the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, and leading the country to
victory in the Persian Gulf War.

While Clinton defeated Bush in 1992, leading one to

perhaps question Bush's credible leadership, Bush undoubtedly benefited from his
experience as vice-president and the Republican legacies left by Reagan, particularly in his
first three years in office. Both Truman's and Clinton's inexperience was more evident
after following eras of strong, persuasive presidential power.
In addition to the inexperience of both Truman and Clinton, the political

environments in 1946 and 1994 were also similar. In 1946, the American public was
.

:'~
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frustrated with the stagnation of the Democratic hegemony from the New Deal coalition.
Truman's lack of leadership in the transition to a stable postwar economy and the lack of
new ideas to attract voters, opened the door to Republican victory. In 1994. while unified
government was only in its second year, the public had again become frUstrated with
stagnation and gridlock in Washington. Clinton had failed to achieve his ambitious goals
that he put forth in his 1992 election. The congressional elections of 1946 and 1994 were
both during periods of long Democratic rule in Congress, following 14 and 40 years
respectively, of Democratic control in Congress.

By 1946 and 1994, the public's

frustrations with the stagnation and political quagmire in Washington opened the door for
change, resulting in the pendulum swing during those midterm congressional elections.
The theories of congressional elections that were explained earlier in this analysis
were clearly upheld in 1946 and 1994. Turnout in the midterm election was low, 37.1 % in
1946 and 36.0% in 1994 compared to 48.1 % and 47.0% in House races in 1948 and 1996,
respectively. As expected, turnout was even higher in the presidenti al races, 51. I % in
1948 and 49.0% in 1996. In addition, the midterm elections of 1946 and ·1994 proved to

51

be referenda of the incumbent president's first two years in office. The president's party
expected to lose seats in both 1946 and 1994. Harry Truman and Bill Clinton both had low
approval ratings as Democrats headed into the midterm congressional elections.

In

September 1946, Truman's approval ratings were down to 32%, Clinton's were down to
41 % in mid-October 1994. Given the low approval ratings, both Truman and Dinton did
little campaigning for congressional Democrats. Funhermore, incumbent Democrats did
not want to tie themselves to presidents with such low popularity.
The election results of 1946 and 1994 were also similar.

Not only did the

Republicans gain control of both houses of Congress in these elections, but they did so by
defeating more Democratic incumbents than usual. This is particularly unusual given the
theories on incumbency advantage. On average, incumbent reelection rates have been over
90% since World War ll, yet in 1946 and 1994 the reelection rates of Democratic
;)
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incumbents were 77.1 % and 84.8% respectively. In 1946, 52 House incumbents were
defeated, 48 of whom were Democrats. In the Senate seven incumbents, all Democrats,
were defeated. In 1994,34 incumbents were defeated in the House, and two in the Senate,
again all Democrats. Thus, while overall, incumbents were still successful, the Democratic
Party suffered significant incumbent defeats.

Differences

Two such similar elections in 1946 and 1994 led to two very different results in
1948 and 1996. The similarities between Truman and Clinton that helped bring about the
results of the 1946 and 1994 congressional elections had very different effects on the 80th
and 100th Congresses as well as the election results in 1948 and 1996.

In the 1946

election, the Republicans did not promote their own agenda. but rather were elected as a
negative reaction to Truman's presidency. After the 1946 election, the exasperated Truman
became a much more progressive president, putting forth an ambitious legislative agenda
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for Congress to pass. Particularly in foreign policy, the fear of the Soviet Union enabled
Truman and Congress

(0

become allies in passing the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan.

On the domestic front, Truman and Congress had a more adversarial relationship. Truman,
however, had a brilliant strategy to cast himself as a protector of Roosevelt's New Deal
policies, which Republicans in Congress wanted to cut, instead of casting himself as an
advocate for more change. Truman's difficulties with Congress resulted in 75 vetoes, of
which only six were overridden. Another brilliant reelection strategy was Truman's calling
of a Special Session of Congress. The failure of the Special Session which came
known as the "Do-Nothing" Congress, greatly benefited Truman too.

(0

be

Moreover, the

improvements in the post-war economy also helped Truman to reinvent himself before the
1948 election.
Conversely, Clinton's progressive anempts in his first two years in office had hun
~:~
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his popularity greatly. The failure of Clinton's health care reform was devastating and
proved the difficulties in dealing with a Democratic Congress. Unlike the Republicans in
1946, the 1994 Republican congressional candidates combined negative criticism of
Clinton with a clearly defined agenda, which they were elected to carry out. When the
Republicans took control of the l04th Congress, they brought with them their ambitious
Contract with America

Under the dominating leadership of Speaker Gingrich, the

Republican Congress controlled the legislative agenda, forcing Clinton either to move
more to the right and support the Republican initiatives, or to veto the Republican'
legislation. Unlike Truman, instead of pushing forth his own legislative agenda, Clinton
was forced to take a defensive position in dealing with the 100th Congress. This strategy
was most beneficial when Clinton defended his proposed budget, blaming the Republican
leadership in Congress for the gridlock.

The second session of the 100th Congress

provided an opening for Clinton. Gingrich took on a new, more passive leadership style in
1996, perhaps in response to his own low approval ratings.

The Republican stance

allowed Clinton lhe opportunity to reinvent his legislative role. The 100th Congress ended

53

with only 17 vetoes, of which only one was overridden. Bipartisan compromise as well as
negotiations played a pivotal role in reforming the nation's welfare system, promoting the
continuation of divided. government as the 1996 elections approached.
Unlike 1946 and 1994 in which there were clear similarities in the presidential
campaign strategies and election results, the campaigns and elections of 1948 and 1996
were quite distinct. One similarity was that both Truman and Ointon each faced not only a
well-known Republican challenger in the presidential race, but also relatively strong
independent candidates (two in the case of Truman). Besides the independent candidate
factor, the presidential and congressional campaigns of 1948 and 1996 bad little in conunon
with each other. Truman faced not only the strong Republican challenger, Dewey, but also
had obstacles within his own party to overcome with the campaigns of Wallace and
Thurmond.
~,~

Furthermore, Truman trailed Dewey in the polls throughout most of the
..:r£

campaign. Yet, as described earlier, by November, Truman had metamorphosed into a
strong presidential leader, challenging Congress, promoting his own legislative agenda,
and re-energizing himself before the 1948 campaign.

In addition, given his increased

popularity, he was encouraged to campaign for congressional Democrats as he toured the
country on his whistle-stop campaign.

Despite Truman's close election victory, he

succeeded in bringing back Democratic control to both houses of Congress.
ConverSely,

Clinton~s

bid for reelection was less difficult than Truman's, yet he

was much less successful in bringing more Democrats into Congress.

Clinton was

unopposed in the Democratic primary and led Dole in the polls throughout the 1996
campaign season. The factor that most hurt congressional Democratic candidates in 1996
was that Clinton ran his reelection campaign by taking credit for the status quo, instead of
proposing a change-oriented agenda as he had done in 1992. This tactic hurt congressional
Democratic candidates because Ginton encouraged the continuation of divided government
instead of promoting the re-establisbment of unified control.

He presented himself as

presidential, rather than a partisan political figure and therefore did little campaigning on
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behalf of congressional Democrats. Congressional Republicans also claimed credit for the
status quo and successful economy by promoting the continuation of divided control.

In addition to the differences in campaign styles and characters of Truman and
Clinton, the party system is perhaps the greatest difference between the 1946-1948 and
1994-1996 periods. FDR's success in ending the Depression brought about a New Deal
Democratic coalition in 1932.

The nation as a whole leaned much more Democratic as

Roosevelt introduced social policy programs to boost the economy and provide a safety net
The Democratic leaning of the country had a direct effect on voting

for the poor.

behaviors, as the 1940s was a period when party identification was central to voting
patterns and behaviors. 149

Thus, the American people relied on the strength of the party

system when casting their voting decisions. Given the strong role of the party in making
voting decisions, the results of the 1946 and 1948 elections are not at all surprising. The
:.~
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Republican victory in 1946 was a referendum on Truman's fIrst year in office, and the state
of the economy which led voters to break away from the New Deal coalition. Had Truman
been up for reelection in 1946, it is almost certain that he would have been defeated. But,
Truman's success during his next two years in office, and his harsh criticisms of the
Republican Congress, convinced the already mostly Democratic voters that the New Deal
coalition established by Roosevelt could be revived, and that he really was a working heir
to Roosevelt.

Because the. party system waS so scrong, ticket splitting was much less

common in 1948 than it has been in recent years. While presidential election returns by
congressional district are unavailable, one can examine senatorial races in comparison to
state results in the presidential election.

Of the 32 states in which there were senatorial

elections, Truman won 19, and in all but one (Massachusetts), the Democratic senatorial
candidate won as well. In addition, Democrats also won the Senate seats in the four
southern states that Thurmond captured. Thus, the continuation of realignment of the

149
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strong party system, and the Democratic leaning of the nalion, attributed to Truman's close
victory over Dewey.
The realignment of the Democratic party certainly attributed to both Truman's
reelection as well as the Democratic control of the Congress.

One implication of

realignment theory is that partisan identification is strongest with those who were involved
in politics at the time of the realigning event, in this case, the Democratic response to the
Depression. ISO As the results of the 1946 election explain, under strong party systems
people stray from their party- only because of short-term forces in which candid.a.t.es are seen
as candidates of parties. and not so much as individuals.

In addition, congressional

candidates did not have the ability to run individualized campaigns. Incumbent advantage
in early

post~war years

was due more to party loyalty with one party districts rather than to

running personal campaigns.ISI Thus, the election of 1946 was an aberration; Truman was
not seen as a true FDR Democrat in 1946. and as a result, congressional Democrats were
punished. By 1948, however, Truman had emerged as a strong leader. the economy had
stabilized, and the election results followed.
By the 1990s, the strength of political parties had decreased significantly and
dealignment bas prevailed. IS2

Party identification has become less of an indicator to

predicting voting behaviors, and ticket splitting and divided government have since become
the accepted norms. In addition, the nation as a whole is dealigning politically, and is more
evenly split between the Democratic and Republican parties, w.ith an increasing independent·
support group as well.
Redistricting after the 1990 census also had a great impact on recent election results.
The South and West gained more seats after redistricting, and on average were more
Republican in voting habits than states in the Northeast and Midwest that lost seats.
ISO Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn. Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press; 1987).9.; Campbell. Converse. Miller. and Stokes, The AmeriCQJ1 Voter; Miller. "Pany
Identification and the Electorate of the 19905."
Ul See Cain, Ferejohn, Fiorina. The Personal VOle.
In See Martin Wanenberg. The Decline ofAmerican Political Parties, 1952-1994 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press. 1996)
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Majority-minority districts also helped Republicans by packing African-American voters,
who are mostly Democratic supporters into minority districts, leaving neighboring districts
relatively more Republican. l53

The effects of both redistricting and the House Bank

Scandal were apparent in 1992, in that despite Busb's poor showing and his inability to
generate much popular partisan support, the Republicans still picked up ten seats.
Given the dealignment of political parties and redistricting in 1990, the election
results of 1994 and 1996 are also not very surprising. Like 1946, the 1994 congressional
elections were a referenda on Clinton's first two years in office and unified government.
The Republicans made efforts to nationalize the campaign and increase the strength of the
parry through their Contract with America. Dealignment prevailed however, in that even
most Republican candidates ran candidate-centered campaigns, appealing to the interests of
their individual constituencies. While all politics in 1994 may not have been local, the
~:\
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electoral effect of national issues varied across districts and regions, depending on
incumbency, the quality of candidates, the amount of campaign spending, I.be partisan
makeup of the district, and the behavior of the incumbent. l54

Most of the seats that the

Republican's gained in 1994 were ones in which they should have held earlier, bur bad
stayed Democratic because Democratic candidates adapted to a more conservative political
environment in unfriendly areas to their party.155
Congressional Democrats did not do as well as Clinton in 1996 because voters
chose to continue the electoral politics of divided government during stable times. In
addition, the changes in structure of electoral competition for congressional seats were
revealed and magnified by the 1994 election results. 156 In 1996, congressional candidates
relied on strong candidate-centered campaigns, as Republican candidates no longer used the
Contract to nationalize their campaigns, and Democratic candidates did little to align

IS) Gary C. Jacobson, "'The Congressional Elections of 1996," in Extension of RenuJrks, ed. Burden A.
Loomis. January 1997,2.
154 Gary C. Jacobson, "The 1994 House Elections in Perspective," 16.
m Jacobson, "The Congressional Elections of 1996," 3.
156 Jacobson, "The 105th Congress; Unprecedented and Uosurprising." 151.
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themselves with the Democratic president. Furthermore, Clinton hoped to win at least 51 %
of the popular vote and thought that campaigning for congressional Democrats would hurt
rum. 157 Ticket splitting in the 1996 election was evident as 25.5% (110) of the 435
congressional districts had split ticket results. ISS Clinton carried 280 congressional districts
in 1996. however he only ran ahead of the Democratic candidate in 27 districts, and trailed
the Democratic congressional candidate in 174 of the races. 159 Thus, the election results in
1996 proved that: dealignment prevailed as voters supported the continuation of divided.
government with a Democratic executive and Republican legislature.

Conclusion

The relationship between congressional behaviors and congressional elections does
~,~

~

not seem to have deviated significantly from post war congressional theories.

By

examining Truman and the 1946-1948 elections and drawing comparisons to Clinton and
the 1994-1996 elections, we have seen that traditional congressional theories still seem to
apply. Congressional theories that were upheld in all four elections include: incumbents
still prove to have an advantage over their challengers; congressional elections are still
candidate-<:entered; midterm elections still seem to be a referendum of the incumbent
executive's performance during his fIrst years in office and the public's sentiments toward
the state of the economy; the President's party can still expect to lose seats in an off-year
election; presidential coanails have become shorter in recent years; and voter turnout is still
likely to decrease. All of these theories applied during the midterm elections of 1946 and
1994, leading to the Republican control of both houses of Congress and a Democratic
president.

Nelson. 'The Election: Turbulence and Tranquillity in Contemporary American Politics," 52.
Ornstein. Mann, Malbin, Vifal Suuistics on Congress 1997-1998. 71.
139 Ibid., 72. Note numbers are computed on the basis of aCluai presidential vote wilb Ross Perot included.
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The differences during these times were more a reflection in the character and
campaign differences between Harry Truman and Bill Clinton and the strength of the
political party system in the United States, than a reflection upon changes in congressional
theories. The difference can been seen throughout several factors in the 1948 and 1996
elections. First, in 1948, Truman had a natural Democratic majority to rally whereas now,
during the Clinton administration, the parties are evenly matched and party itself is a less
influential factor in voters' decisions.

Second, the New Deal policies that Truman

defended in 1948 enjoyed broad public support, whereas current Republican themes of
lower taxes and smaller government hold sway. Third, the dealigning of political parties
helped Clinton to secure election victory by adapting to a more conservative political
environment, while Truman relied heavily upon Democratic majorities to secure his close
victory over Dewey. Finally. lingering questions about Clinton's personal character have
"

--.

offered voters additional reason to leave RepUblicans in a position to keep a watchful eye
on him. Truman's 1948 election campaign was a "spirited partisan defense of the New
Deal," while Clinton's campaign in 1996 was indistinguishable from that of a moderate
Republican. 160 Ironically, because of the nature of divided government which forced
compromise between Republicans and Democrats, both sides were brought together to a
more acceptable middle ground for the public to reelect.
The watershed congressional elections of 1946 and 1994 seem to be extreme
ex.amples of what political scientists have corne to expect in midterm elections. The 1946
election was a blip on the radar screen, as 1948 led to a Democratic victory in Congress and
the presidency, returning the government to unified control. In 1996, however, the recent
trends of divided government were evident, and may in fact be more comparable to
Reagan's reelection in 1984. Like Clinton, Reagan won reelection easily in 1984, but the
Republicans picked up only 14 seats in the House and lost three in the Senate.

Both

Reagan and Clinton ran strong campaigns, highlighting the strong economies and popular

160
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policy successes. Both drew upon extraordinary political skills to extend their appeal
beyond their party's expected electoral base, yet neither did much to help congressional
candidates from their party. As divided government has become the increasing nonn in
American politics, it is not surprising that when times are good and the president deserves
another term, voters do not choose to replace incumbents or the majority party in Congress,
who claim credit for peace, prosperity. and progress.
So what do these results mean about the future of congressional elections? Well, as
the 1998 congressional elections approach, it seems as if Republicans can look forward to
at least two more years in control of the Congress. First, the Republican Party is on its
way to building the strong congressional base in the South that once gave Democrats
security in the battle to control the House and Senate. Second, incumbency advantage and
the loss of congressional seats in midterm elections is likely to strengthen the Republican
~,~
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grip on Congress in 1998. Finally, the dealignment of the political party structure is likely
to result in the continuation of divided government. Thus, it is almost certain that Clinton
will face a Republican Congress for the remainder of his presidency.
Since elections are fundamental to a democracy, periodically reexamining election
theories is important in assessing the stability of our democratic government. In this case,
congressional election theories were reexamined to ensure that they can still be used to
explain results of congressional elections; why two such similar congressional elections,
those of 1946 and 1994 were to be followed by two such different elections, those of 1948
and 1996. respectively. As this thesis has demonstrated, all of the traditional congressional
election theories still apply. The difference in the election results of 1948 and 1996 were
more a reflection of the change in the political party system, and the different personalities
and campaigns of Truman and Ointon, rather than a change in congressional theories.
Nonetheless, it is necessary that these same congressional election theories continue to be
tested and reexamined by scholars of political science in future years.
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